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INTRODUCTION
The most significant change in New York commercial law during the
2001-02 year was the enactment of revised Uniform Commercial Code
Article 9, which became effective July 1, 2001, although the full impact of
this change will not be felt for several years.1 These revisions have been
discussed in great detail in the previous two Surveys.2  In Indosuez
International Finance B. V. v. National Reserve Bank, the New York Court
t Assistant Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law; B.S. New York University,
1980; MBA, New York University, 1983; J.D. Fordham University School of Law, 1991.
1. See Samuel J. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law, 2000-01 Survey
of New York Law, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247 (2002) [hereinafter 2000-01 Survey], Samuel J.
Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial law, 1999-2000 Survey of New York Law, 51
SYRACUSE L. REV. 279 (2001) [hereinafter 1999-2000 Survey] (discussing provisions of
revised Article 9).
2. 2000-01 Survey, supra note 2, at 309-14; 1999-2000 Survey, supra note 2, at 338-44.
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of Appeals continued its choice of law jurisprudence, finding that New
York had the paramount interest in having its law applied to the entire
dispute between a Netherlands bank and a Russian bank that selected New
York law to govern a portion of their transactions.
3
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals dealt a blow to
automobile lessees. 4 In DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the Court held
that Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act lessees do not have standing to bring
suit under the Warranty Act because they are not consumers. 5 New York
state and federal courts continue to develop product liability jurisprudence,
especially in the area of defective design product theory. 6 During the year,
the Second Circuit heard a case involving a conflict between New York
State law and the Federal Arbitration Act. 7 The Court decided in Aceros
Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., that the Act preempts the long
standing New York rule that, where the parties dispute whether an
arbitration clause is part of their agreement, unequivocal evidence that the
parties intended the clause to be part of their agreement is required in order
to compel arbitration. 8  Instead, under the Act, in the sales of goods
context, courts must use the section 2-207(2) analysis to determine whether
the disputed arbitration provisions will enter a contract between
merchants. 9  In a case of first impression in the Second Circuit, the
Southern District held in Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v.
Barr Laboratories, Inc., that the Convention for International Sale of
Goods ("CISG") preempts state law contract claims, possibly preempts
promissory estoppel claims, but not tort claims brought under state law.10
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
During the year, New York federal and state courts issued numerous
reported opinions on products liability cases. The Southern District
returned to Colon v. BIC USA, Inc., to decide defendant's summary
judgment motion.1 1 The previous year, the Court had issued an opinion on
defendant's motion to dismiss. 12 The plaintiff brought an action based on
3. 98 N.Y.2d 238, 245, 774 N.E.2d 696, 700, 746 N.Y.S.2d 631, 635 (2002).
4. DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 97 N.Y.2d 463, 471, 768 N.E.2d 1121, 1124,
742 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (2002).
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 11-50.
7. Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002).
8. Id. at 101.
9. Id. at 99-100 (citing 9 U.S.C. § I et seq).
10. 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
11. 199 F. Supp. 2d 53, 64-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) [hereinafter Colon I].
12. Colon v. BIC USA, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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"common law tort theories of negligence, strict products liability and
breach of warranty in connection with the design, manufacturing, testing,
merchandising, and marketing of a BIC disposable butane lighter."' 3 As to
the negligence claim,
in New York, a plaintiff must show (1) that the manufacturer owed
plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care; (2) a breach of that duty
by failure to use reasonable care so that a product is rendered
defective, i.e. reasonably certain to be dangerous; (3) that the defect
was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury; and (4) loss or
damage. 1
On the one hand "[a] manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care
in designing a product for use in the manner for which it was intended as
well as any unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use." 15 On the other
hand, "A manufacturer need not incorporate safety features into its product
so as to guarantee that no harm will come to every user no matter how
careless or even reckless." 16 However, "[i]n New York, manufacturers of
disposable lighters have a duty of care to children who may use them
because such misuse is foreseeable."' 17 As to the strict liability claim, under
New York law plaintiffs must show that the product was defective and
caused plaintiffs injury. 18 Once plaintiff establishes these points, the
manufacturer will be held strictly liable. 19 "'A manufacturer who places
into the stream of commerce a defective product which causes injury may
be held strictly liable."' 20 Under New York law, product defects fall into
one of three categories: "(1) design defect, (2) a failure to warn, or (3)
defect as a result of a manufacturing flaw." 2 1 In actions in which plaintiffs
bring defective products claims, New York courts use identical tests to
analyze negligence and strict liability theories. 22 Plaintiffs must "present[]
13. Colon II, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
14. Id. at 82.
15. Bombara v. Rogers Bros. Corp., 289 A.D.2d 356, 356-57, 734 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619
(2d Dep't 2001) (citing Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d
471, 480, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443-44, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980)). The Second Department
panel reversed trial court's denial of defendant's summary judgment motion of plaintiff's
negligence and breach of warranties claims. Id.
16. Id. at 357, 734 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
17. Colon II, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 82.
18. Id. at 82.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 82 (quoting Amatulli v. Delhi Const. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 525, 532, 571 N.E.2d
645, 648, 569 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1991)).
21. Id. at 82-83 (citing Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 579, 517
N.E.2d 1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987)).
22. Colon II, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 83.
2003]
Syracuse Law Review
evidence that (1) the product as designed posed a substantial likelihood of
harm, (2) [a] feasible [design] alternative existed . .. (3) the defective
design caused plaintiffs injury." 23 There is also a fourth requirement "that
the design defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's
control. 24 To prevail on manufacturing defect claims based "either [on]
negligence or strict liability, the plaintiff must show that a specific product
unit was defective as a result of 'some mishap in the manufacturing process
itself, improper workmanship, or because defective materials were used in
construction,' and that the defect was the cause of plaintiffs injury."
25
Thus, "[a] defectively designed product 'is [a product] which, at the time it
leaves the seller's hands, is in a condition not reasonably contemplated by
the ultimate consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended
,,,26use ....
In Colon II, BIC moved for summary judgment based in pertinent part
on the ground that there was "no duty to warn when additional warnings
would be superfluous under the circumstances." 27 "It is well established
that '[a] manufacturer has a duty to warn against latent dangers resulting
from foreseeable uses of its product of which it knew or should have
known."' 28 Under New York law, to prevail on a duty to warn claim, a
plaintiff "must show (1) that a manufacturer has a duty to warn; (2) against
dangers resulting from foreseeable uses about which it knew or should have
known; and (3) that failure to do so was the proximate cause of harm." 29
As with design defect claims, New York courts use identical tests to
analyze negligence and strict liability theories. 30 Judge Scheindlin granted
23. Id.
24. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Daley v. McNeil Consumer Prods. Co., 164
F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting defendant manufacturer's summary
judgment motion were plaintiffs allergic reaction to "Lactaid" pills placed her in a
"microscopic fraction of potential users"); Marshall v. Sheldahl, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 400,
403 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting defendant manufacturer's summary judgment motion where
plaintiff fails to show that the machine "feasibly could have been designed more safely").
25. Colon 1I, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (quoting Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114,
129, 417 N.E.2d 545, 553, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 259 (1981); see also Daley v. McNeil
Consumer Prods. Co., 164 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
26. Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 655, 659, 717 N.E.2d 679,
682, 695 N.Y.S.2d 520, 523 (1999) (quoting Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d
102, 107, 450 N.E.2d 204, 207, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (1983)). See also Campos v. Crown
Equip. Corp., 35 Fed. Appx. 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2002).
27. Colon II, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
28. Hoang v. ICM Corp., 285 A.D.2d 971, 972, 727 N.Y.S.2d 840, 841 (4th Dep't
2001) (quoting Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 237, 700 N.E.2d 303, 305, 677
N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (1998)).




BIC's motion in part, as to the design defect claims including the failure to
warn claim and denied the motion in part, as to the manufacturing defect
claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to raise genuine issues of material
fact on the design defect claim.3 1  Plaintiffs did not show that the
alternative designs would have either prevented the injuries or lessen their
severity. 32 As to the failure to warn claim, the Judge found that BIC did not
have a duty to warn because (1) the danger was "open and obvious" and (2)
the failure to warn was not the proximate cause of the injuries. 33 However,
the plaintiffs did raise genuine issues of material fact on the manufacturing
defect claim regarding the ease of removing the safety latch on the
particular unit involved.34
In another products liability opinion, Judge Motley explained the
plaintiff's burden of proof in defective product causes of action.
In New York, to survive a motion for summary judgment on a
defective products claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the product is defective
because it is not reasonably safe at the time it was manufactured and
sold; (2) the product was used for a normal purpose; (3) the defect
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries; (4) the
plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable care, would not have both
discovered the defect and apprehended its danger; and (5) the
plaintiff could not have otherwise, avoided the injury by exercise of
ordinary care.
35
Furthe*rmore, "[a] product may be defective because the manufacturer
failed to provide adequate warnings regarding dangers associated with the
product." 36 However, in duty to warn cases, the plaintiff must show that the
failure to warn was the proximate cause of the injuries. 37 As Judge Motley
noted in Hutton v. Globe Hoist Co., "[i]n duty to warn cases, New York
recognizes two circumstances that preclude a finding of proximate cause
between warning and accident: obviousness and knowledgeable user."
38
Thus, "[a] manufacturer has no duty to warn of an obvious danger that
could or should have been recognized as a matter of common sense."
39
31. Id. at 64.
32. Id. at 91.
33. Id. at 92-93.
34. Id. at 94-95.
35. Hutton v. Globe Hoist Co., 158 F. Supp. 2d 371, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
36. Id. at 375 (citing Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1991)).
37. Id. at 376.
38. Id. (citing Andrulonis v. U.S., 924 F.2d 1210, 1222-23 (2d Cir. 1991)).
39. Id.; see also Marshall v. Sheldahl, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 400, 405 (granting
defendant manufacturer's summary judgment motion where dangers of the machine were
2003]
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Hutton's admission in his deposition testimony that he was aware of the
danger posed by the allegedly defective product damaged his argument that
the manufacturer's failure to provide warnings about the product's dangers
was a proximate cause of his injuries.4
Furthermore, manufacturers do not have a "duty to warn of potential
reactions unless a product contains an ingredient 'to which a substantial
number of the population are allergic."' 41 Before courts will impose a duty
to warn on manufacturers, the plaintiff must "show (1) that she was one of
a substantial number or of an identifiable class of persons who were
allergic to the defendant's product, and (2) that defendant knew, or with
reasonable diligence should have known of the existence of such number or
class of persons." 42 Where the manufacturer of a widely marketed product
has not received any reports of allergic reactions by persons taking its
product similar to the allergic reaction suffered by the plaintiff, courts will
grant the defendant manufacturer's summary judgment motion.
43
A. Optional Safety Features
During the year, the Second Circuit, in an unreported opinion, held
that under certain conditions "a manufacturer will not be found liable for
selling a product without an optional safety feature." 44  In Campos v.
Crown Equipment Corp., the court applied the three prong Scarangella test
to the plaintiffs claim that a "forklift was defective because it was not
equipped with certain optional safety equipment, including a backup alarm
and warning lights." 45 A product is not defectively designed:
Where the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom show that:
(1) the buyer is thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the product and
its use and is actually aware that the safety feature is available; (2)
there exist normal circumstances of use in which the product is not
unreasonably dangerous without the optional equipment; and (3) the
buyer is in a position, given the range of uses of the product, to
balance the benefits and the risks of not having the safety device in
"open and obvious").
40. Hutton, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 376-77.
41. Daley v. McNeil Consumer Prods. Co., 164 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 21 A.D.2d 197, 200, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840,
844 (1 st Dep't 1964)).
42. Id. at 373 (quoting Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 21 A.D.2d 197, 200, 249
N.Y.S.2d 840, 844 (1st Dep't 1964)).
43. See id. at 373-74.
44. Campos, 35 Fed. Appx. at 32 (citing Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 93
N.Y.2d 655, 661, 717 N.E.2d 679, 683, 695 N.Y.S.2d 520, 524 (1999)).
45. Id. at 32.
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the specifically contemplated circumstances of the buyer's use of the
product.
46
The Second Circuit found that the manufacturer met all of the
foregoing factors, and thus was not liable for manufacturing a defectively
designed product.47  The Court also noted, that under New York law,
forklifts not equipped with optional back-up warning alarms are not
defectively designed.
48
B. Choice of Law
In products liability cases, "New York applies the law of the victim's
or plaintiff's domicile where the state in which the injury occurred has only
minimal interest in the litigation."
49
In Colon II, the victim was visiting family members in Massachusetts
when injured; thus, Massachusetts' interest in having its laws applied was
outweighed by New York's interest in protecting its domiciliaries.
50
II. SALES
"It is well-settled under New York law that to establish a claim for
breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the
existence of a contract; (2) breach by the other party; and (3) damages
suffered as a result of the breach., 5 1 "[A] breach of contract is not to be
considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has
been violated. 52 Thus, where a plaintiff "fails to plead a specific duty that
arises separate and apart from the contractual duty imposed on defendant"
under a breach of warranty claim, the court will dismiss the claim.
53
Similarly, although authority exists to the contrary, under New York
law, a plaintiff cannot generally sustain both fraud and breach of contract
claims where those claims are duplicative. In VTech Holdings Ltd. v.
46. Id. at 32-33.
47. Id. at 33.
48. Id. (citing Geddes v. Crown Equip. Corp., 273 A.D.2d 904,905, 709 N.Y.S.2d 770,
771 (4th Dep't 2000)).
49. Colon 11, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (holding that Massachusetts, the place of injury,
had only a minimal interest in the litigation as the victim was only visiting there at the time
of the accident).
50. Id.
51. Americorp Fin. Inc. v. St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr., 180 F. Supp. 2d 387, 390
(N.D.N.Y. 2001).
52. Orlando v. Novurania of America, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 220, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 516 N.E.2d 190,
193, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 (1987)).
53. Id. at 225.
2003]
Syracuse Law Review
Lucent Technologies, Inc., plaintiff brought claims inter alia, alleging
fraud, breach of warranties, and breach of covenants. 54 Defendant moved
to dismiss plaintiffs fraud claim, alleging that it was duplicative of the
breach of contract claims.55 Where the fraud claim is based on allegations
of misrepresentations of future intention, New York courts will dismiss that
claim.5 6 For example, "[tihe mere allegation that 'a defendant did not
intend to perform a contract with a plaintiff when he made it' generally
fails to state a claim for fraud .... However, New York courts have
allowed both fraud and breach of contract claims to stand where the
"claims [are] based on alleged misrepresentations of present fact." 58 Under
the Bridgestone/Firestone test,
to maintain a claim for fraud (simultaneously with a breach of
contract claim], "a plaintiff must either: (i) demonstrate a legal duty
separate from the duty to perform under the contract; or (ii)
demonstrate a fraudulent misrepresentation collateral or extraneous
to the contract; or (iii) seek special damages that are caused by the
misrepresentation and unrecoverable as contract damages."
59
While leaving open a finding that the Bridgestone/Firestone test
might not apply to the Vtech case, nonetheless, the Southern District denied
the motion to dismiss, finding that (1) the plaintiffs fraud claims were
based on allegations of misrepresentations of present fact and not future
intent, and (2) the plaintiff's claims might fall within the special damages
exception of the test.
60
However, to maintain a breach of contract action against a seller, a
buyer must prove that the intermediary with whom the buyer dealt was an
agent of the seller. 6 1 In Cotton Field, Inc. v. Samsung America, Inc.,
plaintiffs alleged that they entered into a contract with the defendant
manufacturer to purchase finished designer garments, but when the
garments were delivered, they were counterfeit.62  However, the First
54. 172 F. Supp. 2d 435,436-37 (SD.N.Y. 2001).
55. Id. at 439.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 439 (quoting Gordon v. Dino De Laurentiis Corp., 141 A.D.2d 435, 436, 529
N.Y.S.2d 777, 779 (1st Dep't 1988)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 440 (quoting Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98
F.3d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted)).
60. Id. at441.
61. See New York Times Co. v. Glynn-Palmer Assoc., Inc., 138 Misc.2d 862, 865, 525
N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (NY City Civ. Ct. 1988) ("party asserting an agency defense has the
burden of proof as to agency relationship").
62. 295 A.D.2d 259, 259, 746 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (1st Dep't 2002).
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Department found that the parties with whom the plaintiffs negotiated "had
no actual authority to contract on defendant's behalf," nor did these parties
have apparent agency authority.63 Thus, the court found that there was no
contract with respect to finished garments; there was a contact between the
parties for unfinished fabric, but that was irrelevant for purposes of this
action. 64 Furthermore, even if the parties who negotiated with the plaintiffs
had apparent authority, this would be insufficient to hold defendant liable
for misrepresentation or fraud as the court found that at least one of the




During the year, the Second Circuit heard a case involving a conflict
between New York State law and the Federal Arbitration Act.66 Under
long-standing New York law, "'parties to a commercial transaction will not
be held to have chosen arbitration as the forum for the resolution of their
disputes in the absence of an express, unequivocal' agreement to that effect;
absent such an explicit commitment neither party may be compelled to
arbitrate.' 6 7 This rule has been interpreted as creating a stricter standard
of proof for arbitration clauses than the preponderance of the evidence
required for nonarbitration clauses.6 8  However, although "state law
generally governs issues of contract interpretation in cases arising under the
FAA, such disparate treatment of arbitration provisions is not permitted. ' '69
Thus, in a breach of sales contract action in which the plaintiff challenged
an arbitration clause incorporated by reference into the parties' agreement,
the Second Circuit decided the applicability of the arbitration provision
under a UCC section 2-207(2)(b) 70 material alteration analysis, reversing
63. Id.
64. Id. at 260, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
65. Id.
66. 9 U.S.C. § I et seq.
67. Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 99-100 (2d Cir.
2002) (quoting Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 333, 380
N.E.2d 239, 241-42,408 N.Y.S.2d 410,413 (1978)).
68. See id. at 100.
69. Id. (citing Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional De
Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1993); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1987)).
70. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) provides:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within
20031
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the district court's holding that the arbitration clause constituted a material
alteration of the agreement as a matter of law. 71 In conducting its section
2-207(2)(b) analysis, the court must decide whether the clause "would
'result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by
the other party."' 72 Under Second Circuit jurisprudence construing New
York law, the "surprise or hardship" test contains both objective and
subjective elements. 73 "Surprise includes both a subjective element of what
a party actually knew and an objective element of what a party should have
known." 74 One of the factors to determine whether a term materially alters
an agreement is industry custom or trade usage. 75 "Under New York law,
an arbitration agreement does not result in surprise or hardship where
arbitration is the custom and practice within the relevant industry."
76
Given the presumption that additional terms will enter contracts between
merchants, the party opposing the inclusion of a term carries the burden of
proof.77 In Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., the Second
Circuit, after finding that arbitration clauses are common in the steel
industry, held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the arbitration clause
materially altered the contract in this case.
78
B. Choice of Law/Forum Selection Clauses
Under UCC section 2-207, 79 a forum selection clause that requires an
out-of-state defendant buyer not only to litigate in New York but also to
waive a jury trial materially alters the terms of oral contracts in which the
parties did not specifically address these points.80 In Hugo Boss Fashions,
Inc. v. Sam's European Tailoring, Inc., based on testimony by the
defendant's president denying that his company agreed to New York
jurisdiction, the First Department found that a forum selection clause in the
plaintiff seller's confirmatory memoranda did not come into the parties
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (McKinney 2001).
71. Aceros Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 100-02.
72. Id. at 100 (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 101-02; see also N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4.
76. AcerosPrefabricados, 282 F.3d at 101.
77. Id. at 100.
78. Id. at 102.
79. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) provides in pertinent part: "The additional terms are to
be construed as proposal for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless: ... they materially alter it ...." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-




contract under section 2-207(b) because the clause materially altered the
parties oral agreements. 81
C. UCC Warranties
Under New York law, unless disclaimed, "products are sold with an
implied warranty of fitness that the product is 'fit for the ordinary purpose
for which such goods are used."' 82 However, "the implied warranty will
not be breached if only a small number of people relative to the total
number of persons using the product suffer an allergic reaction."8 3
Plaintiffs do not have to show privity under a breach of an implied UCC
warranty where the victim sustains bodily injury.84 Under New York law, a
plaintiff bringing a cause of action based on a breach of a warranty under
the UCC must commence the action within four years of when the cause of
action accrues. 85 Under UCC section 2-725, "[a] cause of action accrues
when the breach occurs ... [which is] when tender of the delivery is
made." 86 In Orlando v. Novurania ofAmerica, Inc., the plaintiff missed his
filing deadline on the breach of implied warranty claim when he filed the
complaint four years and three months after he purchased tle boat
involved, even though he did not become aware of the defects until two
years after the purchase. 87 Similarly, in Richard A. Rosenblatt & Co., Inc.
v. Davidge Data Systems Corp., the four year UCC statute of limitations
barred the plaintiffs breach of warranty claim despite the contractual




In Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories,
Inc., plaintiff pharmaceutical manufacturer brought inter alia a breach of
an implied-in-fact contract claim against the supplier of the main ingredient
81. 293 A.D.2d 296, 297, 742 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 2002).
82. Colon I, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (quoting Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248,
258, 662 N.E.2d 730, 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 256 (1995) (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(c))).
83. Daley, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
84. Colon I, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (citing Cereo v. Takigawa Kogyo Co., 252 A.D.2d
963, 964-65, 676 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (4th Dep't 1998) (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318
(McKinney 2001))).
85. Orlando, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 223 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 2001)).
86. Id. at 223 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725); see Richard A. Rosenblatt & Co., Inc. v.
Davidge Data Systems Corp., 295 A.D.2d 168, 168-69, 743 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (lst Dep't
2002).
87. 162 F. Supp. 2d 220, 223-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
88. 295 A.D.2d 168, 168-69, 743 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (1st Dep't 2002).
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for one of its drugs.89 The Southern District analyzed the claims under the
Convention for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG")90 "because the
alleged sales contract involve[d] international trade." 91 The issue before the
court was whether there was an implied-in-fact contract as the defendant
denied the existence of such a contract. 9 2 "The CISG, intended to ensure
the observance of good faith in international trade, CISG Art. 7(1),
embodies a- liberal approach to contract formation and
interpretation ... ."93 Under Art. 11 of the CISG, parties may present "a
document, oral representations, conduct, or some combination of the three"
to establish a contract. 94  Furthermore, any course of dealings or trade
usage are part of the agreement unless the parties expressly negate these
factors.9 5 The district court found that an offer existed and that there were
material factual disputes regarding whether an acceptance existed.9 6 This
fact, as well as whether consideration existed under New Jersey law,
97
caused the court to deny the summary judgment motion on this count. The
court further denied the summary judgment motion on the question of the
performance of the implied-in-fact contract.
9 8
The court also held that the CISG preempts state contract claims, but
not tort claims brought under state law. 99 In order to determine whether
89. 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See infra notes 165-87 for a discussion
of the plaintiffs antitrust claims.
90. 15 U.S.C.A. § 52 (2000).
91. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 281. While the plaintiff corporations
maintained their primary places of business in New Jersey, several of the defendants were
domiciled in Canada. Id. at 241-43.




96. Id. at 282.
97. "Under the CISG, the validity of an alleged contract is decided under domestic
law." Id. (citing CISG Art. 4(a) commentary at 43). In order to determine which
jurisdiction's law to apply, New Jersey or Canada, the district court undertook a choice of
law analysis. Id. at 283. Using New York's choice of law rules, the court found that the
appropriate approach was the "center of gravity" test that New York courts use in contract
cases "to determine the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the dispute."
Id. The center of gravity "approach looks to the place of contracting, the places of
negotiation and performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the
domicile of place of business of the contracting parties." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Using this approach, the district court determined that New Jersey law should apply to this
issue as "it has the greater contacts with the subject matter of the case [being] the place of
contracting, negotiation and performance and is the plaintiffs domicile." Id. The contacts
Canada had with the contract was that one of the defendants had a manufacturing plant in
Canada and sent its shipments from there. Id.
98. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 284-85.
99. Id. at 286.
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federal statutes preempt state law, the court must determine what Congress
intended when enacting the federal statute.100 "Confronting the question of
preemption by a treaty, the court focuses on the intent of the treaty's
contracting parties." 10 1 By looking at the introductory text of the CISG to
determine the intent of the contracting parties, the court held that "the
expressly stated goal of developing uniform international contract law to
promote international trade indicates the intent of the parties to the treaty to
have the treaty preempt state law causes of action."10 2 Thus, the CISG
preempts state contract claims, including those brought under the UCC.1
0 3
The court found that the CISG might preempt state law promissory
estoppel claims in some instances, although not in the instant case.
104
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION
During the year, the Fourth Department revisited a dispute it had
initially heard in 1999. In the first opinion, ("Coty I"), the court held that
although comparative fault principles apply to a cause of action for breach
of a fiduciary duty, they did not apply in cases such as this where the
plaintiff did not have a duty to avoid "excessive" spending. 105 The plaintiff
brought suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, negligent
misrepresentation and violation of the Consumer Protection Act, section
349(a) of the General Business Law against her bank and an individual
banker.0 6 In Coty II, the Fourth Department held that the plaintiff had the
burden of proving damages and that these damages could be offset by the
loans the defendant bank lent plaintiff, even though it previously held that
the bank could not counterclaim for unjust enrichment because the bank's
unclean hands precluded it from equitable relief.10 7 Thus, where the
defendants lost money in their dealings with plaintiff, the jury verdict
awarding plaintiff zero damages was upheld.'08
100. Id. at 285 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,45 (1987)).
101. Id. (citing Husmann v. Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 169 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir.
1999)).
102. Id. (citing Asante Tech., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1151
(N.D. Cal. 2001)).
103. Id. at 285-86.
104. Id. at 286-87.
105. Coty I, 262 A.D.2d 946, 946-47, 692 N.Y.S.2d 556, 556-57 (4th Dep't 1999).
This opinion was reviewed in that year's Survey. See Samuel J.M. Donnelly & Mary Ann
Donnelly, Commercial Law, 1998-99 Survey of New York Law, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405,
473 (2000).
106. Coty v. Steigerwald, 291 A.D.2d 796, 796, 737 N.Y.S.2d 744, 744 (4th Dep't
2002) [hereinafter Coty 1H].





The New York Court of Appeals held in DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp. that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not apply to automobile
leases. 109 In analyzing the DiCintio case, the Court began by looking at
several definitions relevant to the provisions of the Act. 10 First, the Court
looked at the requirement that the plaintiff be a "consumer," which
Magnuson-Moss defines as
a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product,
any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration
of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to
the product, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of
such warranty (or service contract) ... to enforce against the
warrantor ....
Thus, for a plaintiff to have standing to bring suit under Magnuson-
Moss, the plaintiff must qualify as a "consumer." 112  In order for the
plaintiff to be a consumer, the underlying transaction must be a sale. 113
This point is supported by the Magnuson-Moss definition of "written
warranty" as a "written affirmation of fact or written promise made in
connection with the sale of a consumer product...,"114 and implied
warranty as "an implied warranty arising under State law.., in connection
with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product."1 15 Because Magnuson-
Moss does not define either "sale" or "buyer," the Court of Appeals turned
to the legislative history of the Act, found that is was "enacted against the
backdrop of the UCC," and consequently turned to the UCC for the
definitions of "sale" and "buyer."1 16 Finding that "[t]he UCC definitions of
these terms require the passing of title for a sale," the Court ruled that the
plaintiff was not a buyer.117 Furthermore, because the plaintiff did not
satisfy the other prongs of the Magnuson-Moss consumer test (being
neither a "transferee" nor "other person entitled to enforce,") the Court
found that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring an action under the
Act. 118 The Court looked to the legislative history of the Act, as well as
109. 97 N.Y.2d 463, 466, 768 N.E.2d 1121, 1121,742 N.Y.S.2d 182-83 (2002).
110. Id. at 469, 768 N.E.2d at 1123, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
111. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3)).
112. Id. at 468-69, 768 N.E.2d at 1123-24, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 184-85.
113. Id. at 469-70, 768 N.E.2d at 1124, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
114. Id. at 470, 768 N.E.2d at 1124, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 185 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6))
(emphasis in original).
115. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7)) (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 470-71,768 N.E.2d at 1124, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 185.




other related legislation, and determined that Congress intentionally did not
extend the Act to protect lessees.
1 19
IV. BANKING & NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
During the year, several New York courts reaffirmed the principle that
depositors cannot benefit from erroneous credits to their accounts. In
Mahopac National Bank v. Gelardi, the Second Department held that good
faith is not an element in the rule allowing a depositary bank to seek a
refund from its depositors where the bank did not receive final settlement
on a check they deposited into their account. 120 In August 2002, the
defendants deposited a third party check into their checking account at the
plaintiff bank drawn on another bank and withdrew all but $500 of the
funds two days later. 121 Later that day, the plaintiff received a notice that
the payor bank was dishonoring the check based on a stop payment request
by the drawer. 122 The payor bank returned the check unpaid the next day;
subsequently, the plaintiff sent a notice to the defendants demanding
payment of the overdraft. 123  When defendants refused, based on the
plaintiff's announced two day funds availability policy for local checks, the
bank commenced the instant action and moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the depositor's checking account "agreement provided that
each account holder 'agrees to be jointly and severally liable for any
account deficit resulting from charges or overdrafts." ' 124 The trial court
denied the Bank's summary judgment motion, but the Second Department
reversed, not only based on the deposit agreement, but also on UCC section
4-212(1), which provides in pertinent part:
If a collecting bank has made provisional settlement with its
customer for an item and itself fails by reason of dishonor,
suspension of payments by a bank or otherwise to receive a
settlement for the item which is or becomes final, the bank may
revoke the settlement given by it, charge back the amount of any
credit given for the item to its customer's account or obtain refund
from its customer whether or not it is able to return the items if by its
.midnight deadline or within a longer reasonable time after it learns
the facts it returns the item or sends notification of the facts. These
rights to revoke, charge-back and obtain refund terminate if and
119. Id. at 472-73, 768 N.E.2d at 1125-26, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 186-87.
120. 299 A.D.2d 460, 461, 750 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (2d Dcp't 2002).
121. Id. at 460, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 115.





when a settlement for the item received by the bank is or becomes
final (subsection (3) of Section 4- 211 and subsections (2) and (3) of
Section 4-213).12
5
New York courts have held that section 4-212(1) provides a remedy to
depositary banks as well.126 Furthermore, under New York law:
[A] collecting bank acts as the agent of its customer, and until such
time as the collecting bank receives final payment, the risk of loss
continues in the customer, [as] the owner of the item..... Thus, the
provisional credit to the customer remains provisional and revocable
until the collecting bank has received the funds.
127
Thus, the Second Department held that the plaintiff bank was entitled
to a refund from its depositors, even if they did act in good faith in waiting
the two days before withdrawing the funds from their account.
1 28
In United States v. Madakor, the Second Circuit noted that "New
York law clearly recognizes the 'mistake of fact' doctrine, and 'money paid
under a mistake of fact may be recovered back.' ' 129 The defendant
appealed her conviction for bank fraud and bank larceny on the ground that
a series of misdirected wire transfers Chase Manhattan Bank credited to her
account became her property; the Second Circuit upheld the convictions.
13 °
Under the UCC, depositors have one year to notify payor banks of
forgeries, alterations, or other unauthorized transactions.1 31 "'UCC section
4-406(4) bars suit to recover amounts paid by a bank on a forged
instrument unless the customer gives written notice of the forgery within
one year of the time the account statement was made available."'' 132 In
125. N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-212(1) (McKinney 2001).
126. Mahopac, 299 A.D.2d at 462, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 116 (citing Roslyn Say. Bank. v.
Jude Thaddeus Glen Cove Marina, 266 A.D.2d 198, 199, 697 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (2d Dep't
1999)).
127. Id. at 461-62, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 116 (quoting Hanna v. First Nat'l Bank of
Rochester, 87 N.Y.2d 107, 119, 661 N.E.2d 683, 689, 637 N.Y.S.2d 953, 959 (1995)).
128. Id. at 462, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
129. 29 Fed. Appx. 636, 638 (2d Cir. 2002) (unreported opinion) (quoting Banque
Worms v. BankAmerica Int'l, 77 N.Y.2d 362, 366-67, 570 N.E.2d 189, 191-92, 568
N.Y.S.2d 541, 543-44 (1991)).
130. Id.
131. N.Y. U.C.C § 4-406(4) (McKinney 2002) provides in pertinent part:
Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank a
customer who does not within one year from the time the statement and items are
made available to the customer (subsection (1)) discover and report his
unauthorized signature or any alteration on the face or back of the item or does not
within three years from that time discover and report any unauthorized
indorsement is precluded from asserting against the bank such unauthorized
signature or indorsement or such alteration.
132. Ryan v. Fleet Bank of New York, 286 A.D.2d 923, 923, 730 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629
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Ryan v. Fleet Bank of New York, the Fourth Department reversed the trial
court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant bank, holding that the
plaintiff depositor could recover losses suffered from a continuing fraud by
his employees that occurred within one year of his first written notice to the
bank.13 3
During the year, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that the doctrine of
judicial estoppel bars separate conversion actions by payees against drawee
banks where payees previously settled with depositary banks and
converter.1 34 In an unreported opinion, Whalen v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of an action by plaintiff who
brought a conversion action under New York UCC section 3-419135 against
the drawee bank that honored a check stolen by a financial planner and
deposited into an account belonging to the financial planner's wife.136
Plaintiff Whalen had previously settled an action against the depositary
bank, the financial planner who converted the check, and the financial
planner's employer based on the same facts.137 The Second Circuit quoted
its decision in Wight v. Bankamerica Corp., to support its decision to
uphold the district court's dismissal of the action on grounds.of judicial
estoppel. 138 In the opinion, the court clarified the doctrine of ratification
which several states other than New York have adopted; "[t]he ratification
doctrine primarily concerns whether a payee can institute an action to
recover against a depository bank in the first instance, not whether a payee
can institute an action against a drawee bank after she has already
recovered money from a depository bank."'
139
A. Certified Checks
A bank that issues a certified check may revoke its certification unless
a holder in due course has taken possession of the check or a third party has
changed position in reliance of the certification. 140 In Industrial Bank of
Korea v. JP Morgan, plaintiff depository bank that accepted a certified
(4th Dep't 2001) (quoting Woods v. MONY Legacy Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.2d 280, 282, 641
N.E.2d 1070, 1071, 617 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (1994)).
133. 286 A.D.2d at 924, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 629-30.
134. Whalen v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 14 Fed. Appx. 120, 121-22 (2d Cir.
2001).
135. N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-419 (McKinney 2001).
136. Whalen, 14 Fed. Appx. at 121.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Wight v. Bankamerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2000)).
139. Id.
140. Industrial Bank of Korea v. JP Morgan, 192 Misc. 2d 219, 221, 745 N.Y.S.2d
646, 648 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 2002).
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check for deposit brought an action against the issuing bank that stopped
payment on the certified check. 14 1 In this case, Chase Manhattan Bank
("Chase") certified a check for a depositor against funds that were
deposited the previous day in the form of a check drawn on Chase by
another depositor. 142 The drawee of that check had placed a stop payment
order prior to Chase certifying the check, but Chase did not learn of the
stop payment until after the check had been delivered to the depositor
requesting the certified check.
14 3
Where a bank certifies a check through error, mistake or fraud, the
bank may revoke its certification. However, if the rights of a third
party have intervened, and the check has reached the hands of a
holder in due course or a party who has changed [its] position,
between the certification and the revocation, the mistake or fraud
cannot be used as a defense against the holder.
144
The reason is that, under New York UCC, a bank that issues a
certified check is "legally bound to pay the check to one rightfully entitled
to the funds." 145 Section 3-41 1(1) provides in pertinent part that
"[c]ertification of a check is [an] acceptance," while section 3-418 provides
in pertinent part that "acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a
holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his
position in reliance on the payment."' 4
6
B. Letters of Credit
In Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Merita Bank PLC, the First Department
reaffirmed that issuing banks must honor demands for payment under
letters of credit unless the party challenging the draw down can submit
proof of fraud going to the "heart of the transaction" as opposed to a mere
breach of contract. 147  In Kvaerner, the plaintiff "failed to support its
allegation of fraud in the transaction underlying issuance of the subject
letter of credit" where the problems in the underlying transaction, involving
the construction of a mine, do not appear to have been fabricated by the
letter of credit beneficiary to allow it to draw down on the letter of
credit. 148 Thus, the First Department affirmed the trial court's decision
141. Id. at 220, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48.
142. Id. at 220, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 221,745 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
145. Id.
146. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 3-411, 3-418 (McKinney 2002).




denying plaintiff's motion to enjoin the issuing bank from honoring a
demand upon the subject letter of credit.
14 9
C. Foreign Banks
During the year, the New York Court of Appeals heard a case
challenging New York's position as a leading banking center in a case in
which New York courts' in personam jurisdiction was based in part on a
course of dealing between the parties and in part on choice of forum
clauses selecting New York in less than half of the transactions between the
parties and in which the courts exercised subject matter jurisdiction under
Banking Law section 200-b.15 0 In Indosuez International Finance B. V v.
National Reserve Bank, defendant, a Russian bank, disputed the
jurisdiction of New York courts to hear the dispute between itself and a
Netherlands bank involving currency exchange agreements.1 5 1  The
Netherlands bank brought a breach of contract action in New York state
court when, subsequent to a Russian government moratorium that
"prohibited Russian residents from making payments to nonresidents under
forward currency exchange transactions," the Russian bank missed four
settlement dates.152  The Russian bank moved to dismiss the cause of
action, alleging inter alia that it did not have sufficient contacts with the
state to make New York courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction proper.53
The agreement consisted of fourteen confirmations between the parties; six
of these contained forum selection clauses naming New York.
154
Furthermore, the Court found that not only did the Russian bank maintain a
New York bank account for currency exchange payments, but also that the
parties engaged in five similar transactions in the past through a New York
bank.1 55 The Court affirmed the lower courts' holdings that New York
courts could exercise both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the
Russian bank.
156
Subject matter jurisdiction was based on New York Banking Law
149. Id.
150. Indosuez Int'l. Fin. v. Nat'l Reserve Bank, 98 N.Y.2d 238, 245-48, 774 N.E.2d
696, 700-02, 746 N.Y.S.2d 631, 635-37 (2002).
151. Id. at 242-44, 774 N.E.2d at 698-700, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 633-35.
152. Id. at 243, 774 N.E.2d at 699, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 634. "A forward exchange
transaction is an obligation to purchase or sell a specific currency on a future date
(settlement date) for a fixed price set on the date of the contract (trade date)." Id. at 242, 774
N.E.2d at 698, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
153. Id. at 246, 774 N.E.2d at 701, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
154. Id. at 242-43, 774 N.E.2d at 698, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
155. Id. at 246-47, 774 N.E.2d at 701, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
156. Id. at 244, 774 N.E.2d at 699, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
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section 200-b.1 57 Finding that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction under Banking
Law section 200-b extends to claims where a party chooses New York for
the place of performance even after the contract is formed," the Court held
that the plaintiff Netherlands bank, which had the right to select the place
of performance under the agreement, selected New York as the place of
performance. 1
58
The Court continued its choice of law jurisprudence during the year in
this case as well. 159 In Indosuez, the Court reaffirmed its position that "the
law of the state with the most significant relationship with the particular
issue in conflict" should apply where the laws of the interested states
vary. 160 Thus, the first inquiry, the Court undertook in Indosuez was
whether New York or Russian law applied to the question of the authority
of the corporate officer who entered into currency exchange agreements on
behalf of the Russian bank with a Netherlands bank. 16 1 Because ten of the
fourteen confirmations in the parties' transactions contained choice of law
clauses selecting New York law, and the nature of the transactions which
called for payments to be made in US dollars, the Court found that "New
157. Id. at 248, 774 N.E.2d at 702, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 637. Section 200-b provides:
1. An action or special proceeding against a foreign banking corporation may be
maintained by a resident of this state for any cause of action. For purposes of this
subdivision one, the term "resident of this state" shall include any corporation
formed under any law of this state.
2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, an action or special proceeding
against a foreign banking corporation may be maintained by another foreign
corporation or foreign banking corporation or by a non-resident in the following
cases only:
(a) where the action is brought to recover damages for the breach of a contract
made or to be performed within this state, or relating to property situated within
this state at the time of the making of the contract;
(b) where the subject matter of the litigation is situated within this state;
(c) where the cause of action arose within this state, except where the object of the
action or special proceeding is to affect the title of real property situated outside
this state;
(d) where the action or special proceeding is based on a liability for acts done
within this state by a foreign banking corporation;
(e) where the defendant is a foreign banking corporation doing business in this
state.
3. The limitations contained in subdivision two do not apply to a corporation
formed and existing under the laws of the United States and which maintains an
office in this state.
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 200-b (McKinney 2001).
158. Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 248, 774 N.E.2d at 702, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
159. Id. at 244-45, 774 N.E.2d at 699-700, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35.
160. Id. at 245, 774 N.E.2d at 700, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
161. Id. at 244-45, 774 N.E.2d at 699-700, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35.
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York [had] the paramount interest" in having its laws applied.)
6 2
The Court further found that, under New York law, the Russian bank
official who signed the agreements was "clothed with [the Bank's]
apparent authority."' 163 As "each of the fourteen confirmations was signed
on behalf of [the defendant Russian bank] by its deputy chairperson [and
the Russian bank] accepted payment into its New York bank account on six
of the [related] transactions" the plaintiff Netherlands bank reasonably
relied on the deputy chairperson's apparent authority.16 4 The Court also
held that the Russian bank ratified the confirmations in a letter from the
chair of its board to the plaintiff s parent corporation.
165
V. ANTITRUST
In Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories
Inc., plaintiffs pharmaceutical companies involved in a "joint venture"
brought an action against a competitor and raw material supplier, alleging
antitrust and related state law claims stemming from the purchase of the
supplier by the competitor. 166 Plaintiff Geneva Pharmaceuticals, a New
Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey,
manufactures generic drugs; plaintiff Apothecon, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey that is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, also
manufactures generic drugs. 167  Defendants are manufacturers of
pharmaceutical ingredients, generic and branded pharmaceuticals, and their
owners. 168 The lawsuit involves the raw material necessary to produce an
oral anti-coagulant medication know as warfarin sodium; 169 one brandname of this product is "Coumadin."' 170 Rejecting the plaintiffs argument
that "summary judgment is inappropriate in complex antitrust litigation,"
the Southern District, (1) citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit
jurisprudence that encourages the use of summary judgments in antitrust
litigation to "isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims... [and]
162. Id. at 245, 774 N.E.2d at 700, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 246, 774 N.E.2d at 701, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
165. Id.
166. 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Although the plaintiffs alleged
that they formed a joint venture, the district court held that they failed to satisfy New Jersey
State partnership law. Id. at 242, 280. The court thus found that one of the plaintiffs did not
have standing to bring its claims arid dismissed its state law claims. Id.
167. Id. at241.
168. Id. at 242.
169. Id. at 243.
170. Id. at 245.
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'to avoid unnecessary trials,"' 171 and (2) finding that "the antitrust claims
in this case may be resolved without regard to issues of intent or motive
and without reliance on facts in the hands of defendants or hostile
witnesses," 172 factors that make summary judgment inappropriate in some
antitrust litigation, partially granted and partially denied defendants'
summary judgment motion.
173
The district court dismissed counts I and 2 of the complaint;1 74 these
counts alleged Violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act175 monopolization and
attempted monopolization of both the generic warfarin sodium market and
in the market for clathrate, the bulk material that is the primary ingredient
in the drug.176 In order to establish a § 2 violation for the offense of
monopolization, the plaintiff must prove "two elements: '(1) possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen or historic
accident."' ' 177  In order to establish a § 2 violation for the offense of
attempted monopolization, the plaintiffs must prove "'(1) that the
defendant has engaged in predatory or anti-competitive conduct with (2) a
specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power."' 178 The district court rejected the plaintiffs argument
that the market for generic warfarin sodium solely, excluding the market
for the branded pharmaceutical, constituted the relevant market;l19using the
combined generic and branded warfarin sodium market, the court found
that the defendants' 8% market share when they allegedly engaged in
anticompetitive activities was "insufficient as a matter of law to create a
dangerous probability that [the defendants] would achieve monopoly
power" in the relevant market. 180 The court further found that the plaintiffs
failed to produce evidence that the defendants took steps for the purpose of
preventing competitors from gaining access to the primary ingredient in
warfarin sodium and dismissed the Sherman Act § 2 claims for clathrate as
171. Id. at 266 (quoting H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005,
1011-12(2dCir. 1989)).
172. .d.
173. Id. at 271.
174. Id.
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-40 (2000).
176. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
177. Id. at 266 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
178. Id. (quoting Spectrun Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993)).
179. Id. at 266-71.




The district court also dismissed counts 3, 4 and 5 of the complaint;
counts 3 and 4 alleged a conspiracy to monopolize under § 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 182 holding that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of
concerted action. 183 Count 5 alleged a violation of § 7 of the Clayton
Act,1 84 based on the acquisition of a supplier of clathrate. 185 The court
dismissed this claim based on the plaintiffs' failure to produce economic
evidence that the acquisition of the supplier "reduced competition in any
relevant market or that. [the plaintiffs] claimed injury ... flowed from the
allegedly unlawful acquisition." 
186
One of the plaintiffs brought a cause of action under the New York
state antitrust act, the Donnelly Act,187 stated in count VI of the complaint.
Because "[t]he Donnelly Act was modeled on the Sherman Act and is to be
construed in accordance with it," the court also dismissed this claim.
1 88
Where plaintiff s complaint:
[S]imply re-alleges the federal antitrust claims under the Donnelly
Act and fails to allege any state policy, differences in statutory
language or legislative history that would justify giving the Donnelly
Act a different interpretation than the federal antitrust statutes ... its
claim under the state antitrust law fails for the same reasons as it
does under federal law. 1
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184. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
185. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
186. Id. at 279.
187. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340 (McKinney 1988).
188. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 279 (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Abrams, 71 N.Y.2d 327, 335, 520 N.E.2d 535, 539, 525 N.Y.S.2d 816, 820 (1988)).
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